Who Can Legally Shoot Down a Drone? A Country-by-Country Guide

The question seems straightforward: who can legally shoot down an unmanned aircraft system? The answer, depending on jurisdiction, is: the military, the federal government in specific contexts, sometimes state and local law enforcement, and almost never private citizens. The legal landscape is fragmented, has evolved rapidly since 2020, and remains full of gaps that create operational risk for organizations trying to protect critical infrastructure.

This guide maps counter-drone legal authority by country, identifies the key statutes and authorizations, explains practical constraints, and highlights the gaps that organizations encounter when they need to defend assets but lack clear legal authorization to do so.

United States

The United States has the most developed counter-UAS legal framework, but it is also the most complex, distributed across multiple agencies, statutes, and regulatory authorities.

Federal Authorities with Explicit Counter-UAS Power

Department of Defense (DoD): The military has broad authority to employ counter-UAS measures to defend military installations, personnel, and operations. This authority flows from the National Defense Act and inherent military command authority. DoD counter-UAS can include kinetic intercept, directed energy, electronic jamming, and cyberattack. Geographic and tactical scope: anywhere within active military operations or on military property.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS): The Preventing All Cigarette Trafficking (PACT) Act (2009) and subsequent amendments granted DHS authority to detect, track, and counter unmanned aircraft systems in the National Airspace System (NAS) and in proximity to critical infrastructure. The PACT Act authority was significantly expanded in 2024 to include:

• Detection and tracking of unmanned aircraft within 100 nautical miles of Washington D.C., near nuclear facilities, on Department of Energy property, and within military installation boundaries
• Authority to "disable, damage, or destroy" unmanned aircraft that pose a threat to national security

DHS exercises this authority through a combination of the U.S. Secret Service (USSS, focusing on Washington D.C. and Presidential security), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA, focusing on critical infrastructure near airports and in NAS corridors), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP, focusing on border security).

Operationally, DHS counter-UAS capability is limited. As of 2025, DHS maintains approximately 12 counter-UAS units nationwide, concentrated in Washington D.C., select airports, and major border regions. These units employ directed energy and electronic countermeasures, not kinetic intercept.

Department of Justice (DOJ): The FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) have statutory authority (18 U.S.C. § 32, Aircraft Sabotage Act) to respond to unmanned aircraft that interfere with federal law enforcement operations, present imminent risk to persons or property, or are suspected of carrying contraband or explosives. This authority is reactive (responding to known threats) rather than proactive. Operationally, FBI counter-UAS capability is minimal; the agency typically requests DHS or military support.

Department of Energy (DOE): DOE has explicit authority to counter unmanned aircraft systems on Department of Energy property and in immediate proximity to nuclear facilities. This authority enables detection, tracking, and mitigation of drones near sensitive nuclear weapons or reactor sites. DOE maintains a modest counter-UAS capability but typically requests DHS support for significant threats.

SAFER SKIES Authorization (2024)

The SAFER SKIES Act (signed into law in December 2024, effective immediately) is the most significant recent expansion of federal counter-UAS authority. It grants:

• Expanded detection authority to TSA and CBP to detect unmanned aircraft within 100 nautical miles of airports and critical infrastructure
• Authority for State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT) law enforcement to detect and track (but not yet counter) unmanned aircraft systems in certain contexts
• Expanded federal authority to counter unmanned aircraft within defined geographic zones (100 nm near airports, near critical infrastructure, near federal facilities)
• Liability protection for federal operators who employ counter-UAS measures in good faith
• Interagency coordination mechanism via the Transportation Security Administration

Importantly, SAFER SKIES grants SLTT law enforcement detection and tracking authority but does NOT grant explicit counter authority. State and local police can detect and track a suspicious drone but cannot legally jam it, shoot it down, or employ directed energy against it without federal authorization in most cases.

The Critical Gap: Private Sector and Facility-Specific Authority

Private entities (corporations, universities, airport operators, critical infrastructure owners) have essentially zero legal authority to counter unmanned aircraft systems, even on their own property. The statutory framework treats airspace as federal domain; individuals cannot defend their own property against airborne threats without explicit federal authorization.

Key statutes restricting private counter-UAS:

• Aircraft Sabotage Act (18 U.S.C. § 32): Prohibits intentionally damaging or destroying any aircraft. Interpretation extends to unmanned aircraft. A private citizen shooting down a drone is subject to federal criminal prosecution.
• Communications Act (47 U.S.C. § 333): Prohibits intentional interference with radio communication. Jamming or electronic disruption of an unmanned aircraft (which communicates via radio) violates this statute. Penalties: up to $500,000 fine and 5 years imprisonment.
• Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030): Prohibits unauthorized access to, or disruption of, computer systems. If a counter-UAS system requires interfering with the drone's onboard computer or command datalink, this statute may apply. Penalties: up to $250,000 fine and 10 years imprisonment.
• Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. § 2511): Prohibits interception of wire or radio communications. Jamming an unmanned aircraft datalink could violate this statute. Penalties: severe (up to $500,000 fine and 5 years imprisonment per intercept).

A private security officer at a critical infrastructure facility who observes a suspicious drone and employs a jammer to disrupt its command link is committing federal crime under the Wiretap Act, even if the facility is under active threat.

Limited exception (experimental phase): In 2023, the Federal Communications Commission granted limited waivers to certain critical infrastructure operators (airports, seaports, nuclear facilities) to experiment with electronic countermeasures on their property, under strict conditions. These waivers are limited, time-bound (typically 18-24 months), and require extensive coordination with federal authorities. By 2025, approximately 30 critical infrastructure sites have active FCC waivers.

State and Local Law Enforcement Authority

The SAFER SKIES Act expanded state and local authority to detect and track unmanned aircraft. It did not expand authority to counter them.

What SLTT can do: Detect, identify, track, and report unmanned aircraft systems in certain contexts (near airports, critical infrastructure, federal facilities). A state police officer can log the drone's flight pattern, altitude, and direction of travel.

What SLTT cannot do: Jam, shoot down, employ directed energy, or otherwise disable the drone without federal authorization. Even in self-defense scenarios, case law is ambiguous. The Castle Doctrine and Stand Your Ground laws (which permit defense of property in some states) have not been tested against counter-UAS charges, and prosecutors would likely argue that federal air jurisdiction overrides state property rights.

Practical Scenarios Illustrating the Legal Gap

Scenario 1: The Suspicious Drone Over the Substation

A utility company's security team detects a drone hovering 300 feet above a critical substation. The drone matches intelligence profiles of a reconnaissance platform used by a foreign adversary. The utility company has no federal counter-UAS authorization. The nearest federal counter-UAS asset (DHS or military) is 45 minutes away.

Legal options: (1) Call the FBI and TSA to report. (2) Evacuate personnel from the area. (3) Document the drone. (4) Shut down the substation. The utility company cannot legally employ electronic countermeasures, even though it has explicit federal incentive to protect the grid.

(5) Request emergency federal authorization from DHS or DoD. In practice, this takes 30+ minutes and requires clear evidence that the drone poses imminent threat. By the time authorization arrives, the drone has departed.

Current regulatory status: The utility is working with the FCC to obtain a temporary waiver for electronic countermeasures. Waiver was expected in Q2 2025. In the interim, the company relies entirely on federal response.

Scenario 2: The Campus Intrusion

A large university detects repeated drone intrusions over research facilities containing sensitive material (materials research, biodefense collaboration, etc.). The university has security personnel and procurement budget for counter-UAS systems. It does not have federal counter-UAS authorization.

Legal options: (1) Call local law enforcement (who can track but not counter). (2) Call the FBI (which can investigate but has no counter-UAS capability). (3) Request federal authorization from DHS. (4) Hire private counter-UAS company to conduct detection and analysis. (5) Deploy electronic countermeasures without federal authorization (felony).

The university is choosing option (3), requesting federal authorization. Timeline for decision: 60-90 days minimum. In the interim, the university is incurring repeated security incidents and reputational risk.

Current regulatory status: Universities have been explicitly carved out of SAFER SKIES detection authorization. The rationale is that university airspace is complex and safety-sensitive. Universities cannot legally employ counter-UAS measures and are ineligible for temporary FCC waivers. They are essentially prohibited from defending their own property.

Scenario 3: The Border Incursion

A rancher near the Arizona-Mexico border detects a drone crossing his property at low altitude, consistent with smuggling operations. CBP has counter-UAS authority in border regions. The rancher calls CBP. The response time is 45 minutes to 2 hours (depending on CBP asset availability).

Legal options: (1) Document the drone and call CBP. (2) Shoot at the drone (illegal under Aircraft Sabotage Act). (3) Jam the drone's communication (illegal under Communications Act). (4) Request CBP counter-UAS support (inconsistent availability).

The rancher chooses option (1). By the time CBP arrives, the drone has completed its mission.

Federal law enforcement perspective: CBP counter-UAS assets are allocated based on threat priority. Not all border incursions warrant counter-UAS response. When countered, CBP employs directed energy and electronic countermeasures.

European Union

The EU has no unified counter-UAS regulatory framework. Authority is national, with significant variation by country.

France

France has developed a relatively clear counter-UAS authority structure:

• Police Nationale and Gendarmerie have statutory authority to detect, track, and counter unmanned aircraft systems that pose threat to public security, critical infrastructure, or presidential security
• Authority extends to kinetic and non-kinetic countermeasures on French territory
• Critical infrastructure operators (energy, transportation) can request police support for counter-UAS but cannot employ measures themselves
• Legal basis: Law on Programming for Interior Security (LOPS), 2017, with amendments in 2022

France has operationalized this authority. The Gendarmerie maintains approximately 40 counter-UAS teams nationwide, equipped with jammers and kinetic interceptors. After multiple drone intrusions over Paris (2022-2024), counter-UAS capability was expanded significantly.

Germany

Germany's authority is less centralized:

• Military (Bundeswehr) and police both have counter-UAS authority in specific contexts
• Luftwaffe (Air Force) operates counter-UAS for military installations and critical aerospace infrastructure
• State police (Länder-level) operate counter-UAS in urban areas with state interior ministry coordination
• Private sector prohibited from counter-UAS measures
• Legal basis: Air Traffic Act (Luftverkehrsgesetz), Police Regulations (Länder-specific), and military authority under Basic Law

Implementation is fragmented by federal structure. Each Länder (state) has slightly different rules. Coordination between federal military and state police is ongoing but imperfect.

United Kingdom

Post-Gatwick (2018, when drones shut down London's secondary airport), the UK developed counter-UAS authority:

• Police (National Police Chiefs Council) and military have explicit counter-UAS authority
• Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) coordinates counter-UAS response with law enforcement and military
• Authority extends to detection, tracking, and kinetic/non-kinetic measures on UK territory
• Critical infrastructure operators (airports, ports, nuclear sites) can request police/military support
• Legal basis: Drones (Registration and Small Unmanned Aircraft) Regulations 2019; Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011

The UK maintains approximately 25 counter-UAS teams nationwide. Authority is explicitly held by police and military, not private entities. A private security team at a critical infrastructure site cannot legally employ counter-UAS measures.

EU-Wide Regulatory Gaps

The EU has no unified counter-UAS standard. This creates enforcement challenges:

• A drone disrupted by electronic countermeasures in France but originating from Germany creates jurisdictional ambiguity
• EU member states operating counter-UAS near borders must coordinate with neighboring countries; procedures are unclear
• Private sector counter-UAS (by facility operators or security companies) is prohibited throughout the EU; enforcement varies by country
• NATO military counter-UAS authority supersedes national law in some contexts, but coordination is imperfect

United Kingdom (Detailed)

The UK's counter-UAS framework is worth detailed examination because it is more mature than most European countries and instructive for other jurisdictions.

Formal authority structure (post-2019):

• CAA holds strategic authority for counter-UAS policy and coordination
• National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) coordinates police counter-UAS capability and doctrine
• Military (RAF, RN, Army) operates counter-UAS for military and national security purposes
• Critical infrastructure operators work with police/military for counter-UAS support

Operational timeline:

• Detection/identification: Police can detect and identify unauthorized drones
• Threat assessment: Police and CAA jointly assess threat level (seconds to minutes)
• Counter-UAS decision: NPCC or military commander authorizes counter-UAS measures
• Implementation: Police deploy electronic countermeasures or request military support for kinetic measures
• Post-action: CAA and police jointly investigate disrupted drone (recovery and forensics)

Lessons from UK implementation:

• Coordination between police, military, and civil aviation authority is essential; absent clear procedures, response times degrade significantly
• Detection technology is easier to deploy than counter technology; most UK police counter-UAS units emphasize detection
• Private sector exclusion from counter-UAS creates significant gaps; critical infrastructure sites are vulnerable in the minutes before police/military response arrives

Australia

Australia has one of the clearest and most operational counter-UAS authorities in the English-speaking world.

Federal authority structure:

• Defense (Australian Defense Force) holds primary counter-UAS authority for military installations and national security purposes
• Federal Police (AFP) and state police coordinate detection and response to civilian counter-UAS threats
• Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) maintains regulatory oversight of counter-UAS measures to ensure airspace safety compliance
• Critical infrastructure operator authority: Explicitly limited. Private entities cannot employ counter-UAS measures without federal authorization.

Statutory basis:

• Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR)
• Crimes Legislation Amendment (Unlawful Drone Activity) Act 2023
• State police powers (state-specific variation)

Operational maturity:

Australia has invested significantly in counter-UAS capability. The Australian Defense Force maintains 15-20 counter-UAS teams equipped with directed energy and electronic countermeasures. State police forces are equipped with detection and tracking systems.

After the 2022 New South Wales bush fires (where drones hindered emergency response operations), counter-UAS capability was accelerated and formalized.

Private sector constraint:

Despite having one of the most mature operational counter-UAS authorities, Australia explicitly prohibits private sector counter-UAS measures. A private security company cannot jam a drone over its facility, even if authorized by the facility owner. This creates the same gap as in the US, EU, and UK.

Israel

Israel operates under different strategic assumptions (persistent air threats) and has accordingly developed more permissive counter-UAS authority.

Authority structure:

• Israeli Air Force (IAF) holds primary counter-UAS responsibility
• Home Front Command (military civil defense) coordinates counter-UAS with civil population and critical infrastructure protection
• Israeli Police coordinates with Home Front Command and IAF for civilian counter-UAS threats
• Limited private sector authority: In designated critical infrastructure, operators can employ electronic countermeasures under Home Front Command supervision

Statutory basis:

Israeli counter-UAS authority flows from broader security law and military command authority rather than specific statutes.

Operational context:

Israel operates counter-UAS continuously, with volumetric threat (hundreds of drones per day in some scenarios). This constant operational demand drives rapid capability development and relatively clear authority structures.

The integration of private sector counter-UAS capability (under military supervision) is unique among Western democracies and reflects the intensity of threat Israel faces.

Synthesis: The Global Picture

Across all jurisdictions surveyed, three consistent patterns emerge:

1. Military/Federal authority is clear; civilian authority is ambiguous

Every country grants its military and central government counter-UAS authority. Civil law enforcement authority varies significantly. Private sector authority is nearly universally prohibited.

2. Detection authority is ahead of counter authority

Most jurisdictions have expanded detection and tracking authority (or are in the process of doing so). Counter authority lags significantly. This creates the operational gap: observers can see the threat but legally cannot respond to it.

3. Critical infrastructure is inadequately protected

Airports, power grids, nuclear facilities, and other critical infrastructure lack legal authority to defend themselves against airborne threats. They are required to rely on federal response. Response times are typically 30 minutes to 2 hours. This is inadequate for many threat scenarios.

Guidance: What Organizations Can Legally Do Today

For Military Operators

Counter-UAS authority is broad and clear. Employ countermeasures as operationally required. Coordinate with host nation authorities where applicable. Document all employment for legal review (legal justification, threat assessment, measures employed, outcomes).

For Federal Law Enforcement Agencies

If you operate under DHS, DOJ, or DOE authority: Counter-UAS authority is explicit for defined threats in defined areas. Establish clear procedures for threat assessment, authorization, implementation, and post-action documentation. Train personnel on legal limits and liability protection.

For State and Local Law Enforcement

If you operate in a state/locality with expanded counter-UAS authority (e.g., SAFER SKIES states): You likely have detection and tracking authority. Counter-UAS authority is limited and jurisdiction-specific. Do not assume you have counter authority. Coordinate with federal authorities (FBI, DHS) before employing countermeasures.

For Critical Infrastructure Operators

Current legal options (as of 2025):

1. Establish liaison with federal counter-UAS authorities (DHS for most facilities, DoD for certain sensitive sites, DOE for nuclear)
2. Document threats and report to federal authorities immediately (this creates legal record and justifies federal response)
3. Request FCC waiver for electronic countermeasures (if your facility type is eligible; waiver process takes 60-90 days; waivers are time-limited)
4. Deploy detection systems (fully legal) to identify threats early and trigger federal response more quickly
5. Hire private counter-UAS company for detection, threat assessment, and federal coordination (legal; company cannot employ countermeasures but can facilitate federal response)
6. Advocate for regulatory change via your industry association for expanded counter-UAS authority for critical infrastructure operators

What you cannot do (as of 2025):

• Jam or electronically disrupt unmanned aircraft without federal authorization (federal crime)
• Shoot down or kinetically intercept unmanned aircraft without federal authorization (federal crime)
• Employ directed energy against unmanned aircraft without federal authorization (likely federal crime)

The regulatory landscape is evolving (SAFER SKIES is ongoing, FCC waiver process is expanding), but as of 2025, private sector counter-UAS authority remains tightly constrained.

For Universities and Research Institutions

Universities are explicitly carved out of expanded federal counter-UAS authority and ineligible for FCC waivers in most cases. Legal options are minimal:

1. Establish liaison with FBI field office for ongoing intrusions
2. Deploy detection systems and document threats
3. Hire private counter-UAS company for detection and threat analysis
4. Advocate for regulatory change via higher education associations and Congress

This is an area where regulatory expansion is lagging operational need.

The Bottom Line

Globally, counter-UAS legal authority is evolving, but unevenly. Military and federal authorities are clear. State and local authorities are expanding but imperfect. Private sector authority is nearly nonexistent.

The critical gap is the interval between threat identification and federal response. In mature democracies with developed counter-UAS authority, this interval remains 30 minutes to several hours. For many operational scenarios, this is too long.

The next regulatory frontier will be either (1) expanded private sector authority to employ limited countermeasures on their own property, under federal guidelines, or (2) dramatically accelerated federal response times via pre-positioned counter-UAS assets and automated response procedures.

As of 2025, neither has occurred. Organizations operating critical infrastructure remain in a legally constrained and operationally vulnerable position.

Related Reading

• The Authority Gap
• SAFER SKIES Act
• EU Counter-Drone Action Plan