#JUNE2025 NEWSWIRE

White House Executive Order Establishes Federal Counter-Drone Task Force

President Biden signed an executive order on June 10 establishing the Federal Counter-Drone Task Force, charging the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security with developing a coordinated national C-UAS strategy. The order directs the Task Force to clarify authorities for federal agencies, develop standards for critical infrastructure C-UAS deployments, and establish interagency processes for countering emerging small-UAS threats.

What matters: This is the most significant federal action on C-UAS authority in three years. The executive order explicitly acknowledges the authority gap—noting that current law constrains private operators' mitigation capabilities while federal agencies lack coordinated protocols for cross-domain defense. The Task Force is tasked with delivering recommendations on expanded private operator authorities, though the order stops short of granting immediate authority.

The order also directs the FCC to expedite frequency allocation review for C-UAS applications and instructs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop C-UAS detection and classification standards. These administrative actions should mature over the next 12-18 months, creating additional clarity on detection system interoperability requirements.

For procurement professionals: This executive order signals that C-UAS authority is transitioning from a niche issue to a national priority. Organizations should expect further regulatory guidance by Q4 2025. Institutions already operating detection systems should ensure they meet or exceed NIST standards once published.

SRC Systems $1 Billion Qatar FMS for FS-LIDS

SRC Systems Corporation announced a Foreign Military Sale to Qatar for approximately $1 billion, delivering the company's FS-LIDS (Fixed Sentinel Land-based Integrated Defense System) counter-drone package. FS-LIDS is an integrated radar, optical, and RF sensing platform designed for large-area airspace monitoring and threat classification. The Qatar sale represents one of the largest individual C-UAS contracts awarded internationally.

What matters: SRC's FS-LIDS is a full-stack, proprietary defense system—radar, sensor fusion, command-and-control, and engagement architecture all integrated within a single SRC-controlled ecosystem. Unlike sensor-agnostic platforms like Dedrone, FS-LIDS is a closed system optimized for government and allied military deployment. The Qatar order validates SRC's technical approach and demonstrates export market appetite for U.S. C-UAS systems.

The FS-LIDS contract also signals that large-area airspace monitoring (protecting entire military installations or national airspace sectors) is increasingly commoditized. SRC is competing directly against Raytheon Technologies, Northrop Grumman, and international vendors (Thales, Leonardo) for integration contracts. The $1 billion price point suggests SRC captured significant market share in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations concerned about Iranian drone proliferation.

For procurement professionals: This contract demonstrates that large-scale C-UAS systems (with full mitigation capability) command substantial acquisition costs. Organizations evaluating detection-only systems should recognize that full-stack mitigation systems cost significantly more than modular detection platforms. The Q uatar order also signals that U.S. vendors continue to dominate allied nation C-UAS procurement, suggesting sustained export demand.

Honeywell Announces Counter-Swarm Capability

Honeywell Aerospace announced development of an automated counter-swarm system designed to detect and classify multiple simultaneous UAS threats and support coordinated engagement against multi-drone attacks. The system integrates Honeywell's existing air defense radar portfolio with new machine learning models trained on swarm behavior patterns and autonomous drone coordination signatures.

What matters: Counter-swarm capability is emerging as a key differentiator in the C-UAS market. Most existing systems are optimized for single-aircraft detection and engagement. Swarming—multiple drones coordinating attacks—is increasingly observed in Ukraine and represents a tactical challenge that single-aircraft countermeasures cannot solve. Honeywell's approach emphasizes detection of swarm signatures (distributed formations, coordinated behavior patterns) and support for simultaneous multi-platform engagement.

Honeywell's entry also signals that the major defense primes (Raytheon, Northrop, Honeywell, L3Harris) are now competing for leadership in counter-swarm architecture. This creates competitive pressure on smaller vendors focused on single-aircraft detection and shifts procurement focus toward integrated multi-platform defense systems.

The counter-swarm capability is not yet operationally deployed at scale. Honeywell is briefing select military and allied customers, but the system requires integration with multi-platform engagement architecture (multiple air defense sensors and weapons coordinating against multiple targets simultaneously). This integration complexity means counter-swarm procurement timelines will extend well into 2026 and beyond.

For procurement professionals: Counter-swarm systems represent the next evolution of C-UAS requirements. Organizations evaluating detection-only systems should recognize that swarm attacks may render single-platform detection insufficient. If your threat assessment includes swarming scenarios, procurement strategy should account for future expansion to multi-platform detection and engagement architecture.

Alpine Eagle Unveils Sentinel Drone-on-Drone Concept

Alpine Eagle, a Colorado-based aerospace firm, publicly demonstrated its Sentinel concept—an autonomous interceptor drone designed to detect, track, and physically intercept threat drones. The Sentinel is a loitering platform capable of 4-hour endurance, equipped with optics-based target recognition and autonomous flight control enabling collision-based engagement of target drones.

What matters: Drone-on-drone interception represents a novel mitigation approach distinct from traditional jamming or directed energy systems. Alpine Eagle's approach uses collision impact as the engagement mechanism—the Sentinel drone is designed to collide with a threat drone, disabling both aircraft.

Technically, drone-on-drone interception has several advantages over other C-UAS modalities:

• RF-clean engagement: Unlike jamming, collision-based intercept does not interfere with spectrum or non-target systems.
• Kinetic precision: The engagement is precise to a single target aircraft, not area-wide like jamming.
• Operational transparency: Physical intercept of a threat drone is unambiguous and documentable, supporting legal defense of engaged responses.

However, collision-based interception also has significant constraints:

• Cost asymmetry: Each engagement consumes an expensive interceptor drone. A $50,000 Sentinel drone is consumed engaging a $500 commercial quadcopter.
• Engagement latency: The Sentinel must detect, classify, and maneuver to intercept. This cycle takes minutes, not seconds. Threats requiring immediate response will bypass this timeframe.
• Limited engagement volume: A single Sentinel covers limited geographic area. Coordinated swarm attacks require multiple interceptors, multiplying costs.

Critically, drone-on-drone interception likely remains legal only for government operators acting under explicit federal authority. Private operators attempting collision-based interception could violate the Aircraft Sabotage Act, the Communications Act (if RF-guided engagement is used), and various state aviation regulations.

For procurement professionals: Alpine Eagle's Sentinel represents innovative thinking about C-UAS approaches, but the legal and economic constraints are substantial. Monitor further demonstrations and technical maturation, but do not assume this approach will be available to private operators in near-term deployment timelines.

CEPA NATO Counter-Drone Recommendations Advance

The Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) released updated NATO counter-drone strategic recommendations, emphasizing integrated layered defense, sensor network standardization, and expanded authority for allied nations' private operators. The CEPA briefing addresses the European equivalent of the U.S. authority gap—European critical infrastructure operators face similar legal constraints to their U.S. counterparts, limiting private sector C-UAS investment.

What matters: NATO is moving toward standardized C-UAS architecture across member nations, creating interoperability requirements and capability baselines. The CEPA recommendations specifically endorse sensor network standardization, enabling NATO allies to share airspace intelligence across borders. This is particularly relevant for European organizations operating near borders with transit routes used for persistent surveillance or hostile drone operations.

The CEPA briefing also recommends that NATO member nations expand private operator authority within constrained frameworks—enabling critical infrastructure owners to operate detection systems and approved mitigation systems (like non-RF-based kinetic intercept) under specific ROE and licensing frameworks. This recommendation has gained traction among Nordic nations (Sweden, Finland, Norway) facing Russian threat escalation and among Eastern European NATO members.

However, expanded authority recommendations have not yet translated to statutory changes. France, Germany, and UK remain cautious about private operator mitigation authority, preferring centralized government control. This fragmentation creates regional variation in C-UAS authority across NATO, complicating procurement planning for multinational operators.

For procurement professionals: NATO standardization efforts should increase C-UAS capability sharing and reduce vendor lock-in for allied nations. Organizations operating across NATO borders should monitor standardization developments and ensure detection systems are interoperable with expected NATO data formats and protocols. Expect NATO C-UAS technical standards to mature over the next 18-24 months.

U.S. Army Counter-Swarm Exercise Results

The U.S. Army conducted its largest counter-swarm exercise to date at Fort Bragg, testing integrated air defense architecture against simulated multi-drone attacks. The exercise results (declassified summary) showed that existing single-platform engagement systems achieved approximately 40% destruction rate against coordinated drone swarms, significantly lower than traditional anti-aircraft warfare performance metrics (which target manned aircraft at 80%+ destruction rates).

What matters: The Army's exercise results confirm that counter-swarm defense remains an unsolved technical problem. Existing systems designed for single-aircraft engagement scale poorly to simultaneous multi-drone scenarios. The 40% destruction rate reflects fundamental constraints: engagement cycle time insufficient for multiple targets, sensor saturation in high-density threat environments, and engagement precision requirements that exceed current system capabilities.

The Army's recommendations from the exercise emphasize:

1. Automated engagement: Human-in-the-loop targeting is too slow for swarm scenarios. Autonomous or semi-autonomous engagement systems are required.
2. Layered defense: Multi-modality systems (RF, optical, kinetic) working in coordination are more effective than single-modality approaches.
3. Software updateability: Threat adaptation cycles measured in weeks require rapid software updates, not hardware refresh cycles measured in years.
4. Integration complexity: Existing air defense systems (Patriot, Hawk, Avenger) were designed decades ago and cannot easily integrate new counter-swarm capabilities without significant modernization.

For procurement professionals: These Army exercise results should inform threat assessments and requirement definition. If your operational environment includes swarm attack scenarios, procurement strategy should prioritize systems with demonstrated performance against coordinated multi-drone threats. Detection-only systems provide insufficient capability for swarm defense; layered multi-modality systems are required.

What We Are Watching

1. Federal Task Force Authority Recommendations: The White House Counter-Drone Task Force will deliver recommendations on expanded private operator authorities by Q4 2025. Monitor FCC and DHS guidance for changes to detection-only constraints. Organizations should prepare implementation timelines for anticipated regulatory changes without assuming authority expansion will materialize.

2. NIST C-UAS Standards Development: NIST standards on detection and classification will influence procurement requirements and vendor competition. Early drafts should emerge by August 2025. Organizations procuring detection systems should anticipate future compliance requirements and negotiate flexible upgrade provisions with vendors.

3. Counter-Swarm Maturation Timeline: Honeywell's counter-swarm system, Alpine Eagle's drone-on-drone intercept, and Army exercise results all indicate swarm defense remains immature. Monitor vendor claims on counter-swarm capability with skepticism. True multi-drone engagement architecture requires years of integration and fielding before reaching operational effectiveness.

4. Spectrum Congestion and EW Effectiveness: As C-UAS jamming systems proliferate, RF-based C-UAS will face increasing spectrum congestion and reduced effectiveness. Organizations relying on RF detection or mitigation should prepare for degraded performance in contested RF environments. Optical and kinetic approaches become more valuable as EW density increases.

5. International Authority Divergence: NATO members are moving at different speeds on private operator C-UAS authority. Multinational organizations should prepare for regional variation in legal authorities and procurement constraints. Harmonized approaches may take 3-5 years to achieve across all NATO members.

6. Export Control Evolution: The Qatar FS-LIDS order and Alpine Eagle's international outreach suggest U.S. defense exporters are aggressively pursuing international C-UAS markets. Monitor whether export control policy (ITAR, EAR) will constrain international vendor competition or accelerate alignment between allied nations on C-UAS standards.

7. Critical Infrastructure Participation in SAFER SKIES: The White House executive order specifically mentions expanding SAFER SKIES participation. Organizations eligible for the program should expect recruitment efforts and integration requirements over the next 12 months. Budget for technical coordination costs and law enforcement liaison establishment.

Related Reading

• C2 Platform Wars
• Rafael
• The Swarm Threat